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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will examine the rise of Special Operations Weathermen during World War II, from 
the founding of the Weather Bureau to the formation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 
OSS-weathermen and their contributions played a significant role to the overall Allied victory in 
all theaters of operation. Concentrating on the first documented use of clandestine weathermen in 
Yugoslavia, I contend that Special Operations Weather was not only crucial to the war effort, but 
as a result, revolutionized behind-the-line weather reporting in modern U.S. military. Since 
meteorological data transcends alliances and nationalities; those who can accurately forecast and 
observe the weather and relay information back for operational use, play a significant role in the 
“go / no-go” decisions for military air, land and sea operations. The successful use of these elite 
group of personnel make weathermen indispensable to the achievement of military operations 
across the globe.
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern day Special Operation Weather Technician (SOWT) is a highly skilled Air 
Force meteorologist who is not only trained as a weather forecaster, but also attends some of the 
toughest Special Operations schools the United States Military has to offer. With a streamlined 
training process that weeds out the meek so the strong survive, the Air Force maintains only 110-
115 of these weather warriors in its arsenal at one time. SOWTs are assigned to support 
conventional and nonconventional units such as the 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne (Air 
Assault) Division, Army Rangers, Green Berets, Delta Force, Marine RECON and Navy SEAL 
teams. These specialized weather operators are a relatively recent addition to the U.S. military. 
While their origins trace back to WWII, as this thesis will explore, it was only in 2008 that the 
Air Force officially recognized SOWT as a specialty career field. 
Background 
 Before U.S. involvement in WWII, the United States’ weather skills lagged significantly 
behind those of the Europeans. With advancements in aviation, specifically the building of faster, 
higher and longer-range aircraft, there was a need for more accurate weather forecasts and 
observations. These aviation advancements necessitated the ability to forecast over an extended 
period of time in a more diverse and geographically dispersed topography in order to ensure 
increased flight safety and mission success. To fill this skill gap in the U.S. military, the United 
States recruited leading meteorologists from Norway, Sweden and Germany to train weather 
officers in advanced forecasting skills at both the California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech) 
and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). At the same time, the U.S. military 
consolidated its weather observing and forecasting schools into a single location at Chanute Field 
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in Illinois and increased the frequency of weather reporting for the expanding Air Force. This 
streamlined training, along with the recruitment of more weather personnel and developments in 
weather equipment for transmitting observations and forecasts, led to the exponential buildup of 
the new Weather Bureau. 
After discussing improved weather training and techniques in Chapter Two, this thesis  
will focus on the conundrum of Yugoslavia, which, prior to WWII, was embroiled in internal 
turmoil due to conflict among the culturally diverse ethnic groups within its population. The 
Illyrian movement of the mid-Nineteenth century, for instance, was an attempt to form a pan-
Slavic nation based on ethnicity and language under the Hungarian Empire.1 But this effort 
inevitably failed. For one, nationalistic ideologies led to cultural dissent from Croatia and 
resistance from the Hungarian royalty. Power over the region was divided between Hungarians 
and Ottomans until the balance of power began to shift again in 1870.  After this point, the 
geographical boundaries were redrawn by the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.2 The new 
boundaries disregarded the ethnic, religious and cultural differences that existed in the Balkans. 
This sparked the creation of the Balkan League, an alliance of Balkan states that fought against 
the Ottoman Empire in 1912-1913.3 It was not until after World War I, during the Conference of 
Ambassadors in 1920, that Yugoslavia became recognized as a state consisting of six Socialist 
Republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. 
With support from the British and French, Yugoslavia was meant to be ruled by a constitutional 
monarch. Following internal rifts, King Alexander I abolished the Constitution and ruled the 
                                                 
1. Wesley M. Gewehr, The Rise of Nationalism in the Balkans, 1800-1930 (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1931). 
2. Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2001). 
3. Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway, Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000). 
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country as dictator until his assassination in 1934. His son, King Peter, opposed the growing 
Tripartite Pact, an agreement that established the Axis Powers and included Nazi Germany, 
Imperial Japan and Fascist Italy, and was forced to flee leaving the people to fend for themselves 
for control over Yugoslavia while simultaneously fighting the Axis Powers.4   
Following a paltry eleven days of resistance on 6 April, 1941, Yugoslavia capitulated to 
the Axis powers. The presence of German, Italian and Bulgarian forces did little to quell the 
internal rifts among the people. With the existing government in exile, two guerrilla factions 
emerged: Dragoljub "Draža" Mihailović and his Chetniks, who were loyal to the abdicated royal 
government, and Marshal Josip Broz “Tito” and his Partisans, who were Communists fighting 
against the Axis and the former Yugoslav regime. 
  After establishing the historical context of a Balkan region embroiled in struggle during 
Chapter Three, Chapter Four will turn to the creation and evolution of the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) and its relationship to this conflict. Although there has been an abundance of 
scholarly research conducted regarding the OSS and its role during the war, not much attention 
has been given to its actions in Yugoslavia. Prior to the formation of the OSS, which was led by 
World War I hero William “Wild Bill” Donovan, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had sent 
Donovan to observe the situation in the Mediterranean Area in 1940.5 Upon receiving Donovan’s 
report, Roosevelt concluded that the area was crucial to halting Axis expansion. In 1942, the 
OSS was finally activated, modeled closely after the British’s new intelligence service, the 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) branch. At this point, the two national agencies began to 
                                                 
4. Prince Paul, the Regent of Yugoslavia, sent his ambassadors to sign the Axis pact, against the people’s 
will, on March 25, 1941.This led to a coup which led to King Peter taking the throne at an earlier than expected age. 
Britain and Russians praised the coup but neither offered to help when Hitler launched attacks on Belgrade. Robert 
Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). 
5. For an in-depth review of the formation and mission of the OSS, see Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of 
the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), Vol 1 (New York: Walker, 1976). 
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operate in unison – albeit not a happy one. The OSS and SOE both held the mandate to conduct 
sabotage and espionage activities behind enemy lines. Only the OSS ran intelligence gathering 
and propaganda efforts, since the SOE had to concede these duties to MI-6, its intelligence-
gathering brothers.  
The OSS and SOE were at one time supporting both Mihailović and Tito. However, 
following the Tehran Conference in 1943, the British and American governments decided, along 
with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, to concentrate Allied support on Tito’s efforts. This choice, 
which has been second-guessed by the annals of history, was made because the Big Three 
believed it would yield the most success in the fight against the Nazis. Despite Tito’s distrust of 
both British and American agents, given their prior support to Mihailović, the Allied backing of 
Tito and his Partisans resulted in enough strength and momentum to force the Nazis from the 
country.6 During this time, there was still strife between the Chetniks and Partisans, as well as 
between the OSS and SOE. Despite these struggles, the mission was successful. Many historians 
nonetheless believe that Yugoslavia and the roles the OSS and SOE played in Balkans were not 
significant in the overall scheme of the war. I plan to demonstrate that this conclusion is false, 
that the OSS and SOE helped Tito reach the apex of power that ensured an Allied victory and 
that covert operations, specifically the use of clandestine weathermen, precipitated this success 
and was a major factor in ridding the country of the Nazi regime. 
 The unique culmination of the aforementioned events, along with the Allies’ decision to 
support the Yugoslavian partisan movement, made weather support for Air Raids, Strategic 
Bombing and military operations in enemy-held territories a new focus of the war effort. This 
thesis will specifically examine the impact of the American-run weather network established in 
                                                 
6. Walter R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1973) and Stephen Clissold, Whirlwind; An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1949). 
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Yugoslavia in 1944 on missions that helped to eradicate the Nazi war machine’s presence in 
Yugoslavia and surrounding regions. Focus is given to how the weather network allowed for 
increased air support to Tito’s Partisans in Yugoslavia and their fight against the Nazi occupation 
of their homeland.  
The thesis will also examine how Allied weather stations allowed for more frequent and 
accurate bombing raids against Nazi factories in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the 
destruction of the oil fields at and near Ploesti, Romania. By supporting the guerilla uprising and 
destroying key military manufacturing facilities and refineries, the Allied activities in the 
Balkans were crucial to the Red Army’s 1944 offensives that all but annihilated the Nazi regime 
on the Eastern Front and paved the way for the arguably more significant Allied invasion in 
Normandy: Operation OVERLORD. The following chapters will present – through critical 
analysis of unit histories, after action reports, personal interviews and letters – the story of the 
OSS weathermen in the Balkans and their contributions to the overall Allied mission. The 
success of OSS weathermen in this operation had a profound impact on the remainder of the war, 
as well as on future military actions across the globe. Following these experimental Balkan 
missions, specially trained weathermen were inserted behind enemy lines in almost every major 
military advancement from Normandy to the Pacific Islands during WWII.  
Historiography 
 U.S. and Allied military operations in Yugoslavia have been largely neglected in the 
historical accounts of activities during World War II. For example, in the Green Books, which 
are considered the U.S. Army’s official history of World War II, operations conducted in 
Yugoslavia are not addressed in great detail. The section titled “The Mediterranean Theater of 
Operations” has only fleeting references to Yugoslavia, and even less information on OSS 
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missions in the country.7 While some might argue that the OSS was not a military unit, it was 
under direct command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and comprised of military personnel 
from the different U.S. branches. By all reasonable accounts, the OSS, which relied heavily on 
the U.S. military and Allied support to succeed in Yugoslavia, was an extension of the military 
and their courageous and often dangerous actions should not have been overlooked in any 
“official account.” While The Army Air Forces in World War II, the “Blue Books” which are not 
an official history, do mention OSS weathermen being deployed to Yugoslavia as part of a 
“special infiltration mission,” nothing further is mentioned.8 
 Rick Atkinson’s Liberation Trilogy, which focuses on U.S. forces during World War II in 
the European Theater of Operations, explores the importance of Air Power and Strategic and 
Tactical Bombing in the Mediterranean.9 Atkinson argues that the destruction of targets such as 
the Ploesti Oil Fields and the Fifteenth Air Force’s (based out of Bari, Italy) dominance in the air 
was significant to stopping the Nazi War Machine. However, he fails to give details of how 
exactly these achievements were made possible. My thesis will discuss the details of OSS 
operations that allowed these missions to succeed. Specifically, it will outline the role of OSS 
weathermen in enabling more effective and frequent day and night-time flying over Yugoslavia, 
which increased air dominance by sending vital weather reports back to Bari for missions to 
                                                 
7. The sections in this volume are titled “Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West,” “Sicily and 
the Surrender of Italy,” “Salerno to Cassino” and “Cassino to the Alps.” The Tehran Conference is mentioned in 
“Salerno to Cassino” along with the decision to support the Partisans, yet no detail on how the support was carried 
out is given. United States, United States Army in World War II. The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957). Vol 6. 
8. It is mentioned that one OSS weather team was parachuted in near Ticevo in February 1944, yet there 
were actually four teams in country. The team referenced during that time parachuted in near Dravr – Tito’s 
headquarters. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate The Army Air Forces in World War II: Europe: Augment to 
V-E Day (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 519-520. 
9. Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944 (New York: Henry Holt, 
2007) and The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945 (New York: Henry Holt, 2013). 
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resupply the country, rescue downed pilots and injured allies, as well as allow for aerial attacks 
on key targets in the Balkans. 
Not all historians agree that special operations efforts in Yugoslavia were of importance 
to the overall success of the war. Historian John Keegan, for instance, characterizes the effect of 
SOE/OSS operations on the ultimate defeat of Hitler as “ambiguous,” arguing that they fail[ed] 
in [their] claim to have contributed significantly to Hitler’s defeat.”10 This position is a common 
mistake in historical accounts. Misunderstanding and lack of information has led to the 
prevailing neglect of this topic in “official” military history interpretations. Most appear to track 
Allied advances from Sicily, to the Gustav Line, to the Alps, then skip straight to the invasion of 
Normandy on D-Day. However, during the period of Allied actions on the mainland of Italy, the 
cross-Adriatic covert operations in Yugoslavia paved the way for the success of D-Day. 
Historians and World War II experts have mentioned the impact of weather on military 
operations; however, they mostly focus on the larger scale operations such as OVERLORD and 
MARKET GARDEN. This holds true for military historians and even large military 
organizations such as the Air Force Weather Agency and Air Force Historical Research Agency. 
It is unfortunate that OSS weathermen, in particular those deployed in Yugoslavia, have been 
mostly overlooked, and on the rare occasions they are mentioned, it is generally in inaccurate 
accounts that fail to reveal the bigger picture of these men’s involvement in the liberation of 
Yugoslavia. 
In terms of histories written by military agencies, three books, all of which have appeared 
on the Air Force Weather Professional Reading List, inadequately address these men and their 
accomplishments. The first book, America's Weather Warriors: 1814-1985, written by WWII 
Naval weatherman Charles Bates along with long-time Air Weather Service Historian John 
                                                 
10. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books. 2005), 495. 
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Fuller, contains a number of inaccuracies in its account of weather warriors in Yugoslavia. Bates 
and Fuller claim, for one, that weather was a prime issue affecting supply drops to Tito and his 
Partisans. This is true, yet the they also assert that, to overcome weather difficulties, the “Cairo-
based 19th Weather Squadron trained eleven officers and sixteen enlisted men to work behind 
the lines with Tito’s guerillas …”11 Bates and Fuller also report that these operations began on 
March 14, 1944, with the insertion of a two-man weather team in Slovenia. My extensive 
research using primary military sources has shown that, in fact, the Cairo-based weather 
squadron did not train these men. It was the OSS that recruited them. Secondly, the airborne 
infiltration of these weathermen began earlier than the date given, and the mission the author 
recounts was not the first weather team in country. 
 Thor’s Legion: Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army 1937-1987, by John 
Fuller, states similarly that eleven officers and sixteen men were trained to “support bombing 
missions from North Africa against Balkan’s targets … and AAF and Royal Air Force C-47s 
airlifting urgently needed supplies to Marshall [sic] Josip Tito’s pesky partisans.”12 Fuller comes 
closer to telling a more accurate story of the OSS weathermen; however, his account lacks 
verifiable detail and disregards the actions of the other OSS weathermen in the country. One 
such inaccuracy is the fact that the bombing missions were not launched from North Africa, but 
rather from Bari and Brindisi, Italy. 
Air Force Weather: Our Heritage 1937-2012, a book self-described as one of 
“milestones” of Air Force Weather, contains only one mention of the OSS weather mission in 
Yugoslavia. Inaccurate information again leads readers to believe that on March 10, 1944, two 
                                                 
11. Charles C. Bates and John F. Fuller, America's Weather Warriors: 1814-1985 (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 1986), 81. 
12. John F. Fuller, Thor's Legions: Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army 1937-1987 (Boston: 
American Meteorological Society, 1990), 65. 
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weathermen, along with their radio operator, parachuted into Slovenia with Tito’s men on C-47 
resupply missions.13 Here again, the date given for the jump is incorrect, and the first mission is 
not cited at all. It was Captain Cecil E. Drew and weather observer S/Sgt Joseph J. Conaty Jr. 
who on February 27, 1944, first parachuted into Yugoslavia and set up operations at Tito’s 
headquarters, according to After Action Reports and Sortie Mission Logs. 
In addition to academic and military historic accounts, scattered references to OSS 
weathermen in autobiographies of those who flew the missions or led ground troops do not 
adequately address the OSS’ efforts. Examples of this genre include Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean’s 
Eastern Approaches and Frank Lindsay’s Beacon in the Night.14 
By relying on unpublished primary sources, I plan to set the record straight and provide 
an accurate account of Operation BUNGHOLE and its role in liberating Yugoslavia from the 
Nazi regime. Using untouched primary sources held at the National Archives Records and 
Administration in College Park, MD, The National Archives in the Public Records Office in 
Kew, London and the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency, this thesis will paint a fuller 
picture of the importance of Allied support and OSS weathermen in Yugoslavia. These 
documents include the personal 201 Files on the individuals who participated in the Operation, 
After Action Reports, Army Air Forces Squadron Sortie reports, OSS monthly reports, SOE 
correspondence and other documents which pertain to the mission. The thesis also utilizes 
personal interviews and letters from these OSS weathermen archived with the Grey Beret 
Association. The project argues that these specialized weathermen were instrumental in 
                                                 
13. Air Weather Association, Air Force Weather: Our Heritage 1937-2012, 2nd ed. Compiled by George 
N. Coleman III. AFW 37-12v2 (Offutt AFB: Air Weather Service and Air Force Weather Agency, 2014), 2-9. 
14. Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (London: Penguin Books, 1991); Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in 
the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
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solidifying Nazi defeat on the Eastern Front, allowing the Red Army to continue their advance to 
Berlin in 1945. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 EXAMINING WEATHER IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT  
People have been fascinated with atmospheric phenomena throughout time, as ample 
historical evidence has shown. Not until the advent of aviation, however, did meteorology 
become truly indispensable to military endeavors. With the construction of a rudimentary wind 
vane in 500 B.C., the Greeks were arguably the first to develop any type of meteorological 
instrument. Rainfall was the first weather element to be collected; documentation traces back to 
India in 400 B.C.E. Galileo invented the thermometer around 1603 based on the principle that 
the density of liquid changes in response to changes in temperature. Notable figures have made 
weather observations throughout U.S. history: Francis Bacon recorded weather data in his 
writings, Benjamin Franklin annotated wind and sky conditions to track storm movement and 
Thomas Jefferson maintained a daily log of weather reports in his Garden Book.  
 Building from these early American weather observations, a permanent and consolidated 
meteorological service developed over a century later in the United States, when technology and 
science caught up with human curiosity. Establishing a permanent weather network was made 
possible by more accurate weather recording equipment, scientific understanding of the 
atmosphere and the invention of telegraphy. With the advent of telegraphic communications, 
daily weather observations and forecasts could be sent out via telegraph to newspapers and 
railroad stations. In order to centralize this new assemblage of weather predictions, President 
Ulysses S. Grant signed into law the creation of what is known today as the National Weather 
Service on  February 9, 1870, under the care of the U.S. Army Signal Service. On October 1, 
1890, President Benjamin Harrison passed an act that transferred governmental meteorological 
responsibilities to the newly formed U.S. Weather Bureau under the Department of Agriculture. 
12 
 
As communications and aeronautics became more prominent in the U.S., the aviation weather 
service was established in 1926 under the Air Commerce Act and in 1940 the U.S. Weather 
Bureau was moved to the Department of Commerce.15 On December 26, 1941, 19 days after 
Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) designated the Weather Bureau a “war 
agency” by Executive Order 8991.16  
This chapter will explore the background that made WWII Special Operations 
Weathermen a possibility. First, I introduce basic weather concepts necessary for taking surface 
observations and creating forecasts in combat situations. I then outline some meteorological 
advancements that were central in the growth of military weather before WWII and discuss the 
consolidation of military weather agencies and training. Next, I give an account of early 
twentieth century advancements in aviation that required and facilitated a drastic change in how 
weather was used in military situations. Lastly, I describe the particular weather phenomena that 
concerned military aviators in the Balkans during the Second World War and the OSS 
weathermen who were tasked with supporting them.  
Measuring and Understanding Atmospheric Elements 
Weather is typically defined as the state of the atmosphere at a given time and place. 
Knowledge of basic meteorological surface conditions and the instruments used to measure them 
is necessary in order to understand how weather impacts aviation and other mission conditions. 
The standard equipment issued to weather observers during the first half of the twentieth century 
included a barometer, thermometer, hygrometer, anemometer, wind vane and other 
instruments.17 Weather observers used their training to report cloud types and coverage, along 
                                                 
15. Donald R. Whitnah, A History of the United States Weather Bureau (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1965), 195. 
16. Bates and Fuller, America’s Weather Warriors, 51. 
17. Whitnah, A History of the United States Weather Bureau, 25. 
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with other visually observable weather phenomena such as precipitation type, thunderstorms, 
lightning and visibility. 
Barometers are used to measure atmospheric pressure at a stationary location. Pressure is 
defined as the amount of force exerted over a given surface area and is typically reported using 
the nearest tenth of a millibar (mb). However, pressure can also be measured by how far mercury 
is forced in a barometer. If a mercury barometer is used, pressure is reported using inches of 
mercury (inHG). Meteorologists are interested in finding areas of relatively low pressure and 
high pressure as lows typically are responsible for storms and highs are responsible for clear 
weather. Since pressure naturally decreases with altitude, all observed pressure is reduced to a 
common level, usually sea level, or the so-called standard atmosphere (29.92 inHG or 
approximately 1,013.2 mb) to compare locations at different elevations. A measured increase or 
decrease in pressure at a stationary location is used to determine what type of weather system is 
approaching. Pressure can also be used to determine altitude, as pressure decreases the higher 
one rises in the atmosphere. Altitude can be estimated from the pressure’s distance from that at 
standard atmosphere (34 mb equals about 1 inHG which is equivalent to 1,000 feet).  
 Thermometers are used to measure air temperature (heat) at a given location. In the U.S., 
temperatures are reported in degrees Fahrenheit (F); however, most countries use Celsius (C). 
Temperature, like pressure, can be used to estimate altitude. For upper air analysis, the average 
decrease in temperature by altitude is approximately 2° C per 1,000 feet, although it can vary 
greatly. Another important aspect of temperature is the knowledge of insolation, or incoming 
solar radiation that is received from the sun. The amount of radiation that reaches the earth is 
directly correlated to the conditions of the sky and the ground. For example, cloudier days reflect 
more insolation, causing less radiation to be absorbed by the ground and cooler temperatures 
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during the daytime. Cloudy conditions create warmer temperatures during the night, as a 
greenhouse effect is established since clouds absorb and re-emit longwave radiation that is 
emitted by the land. At the same time, the type and condition of the surface must be taken into 
consideration. Sand, water and snow all have different conduction properties. Sand heats the 
quickest since it has a lower specific heat than water. Specific heat is the ability of 1g of a 
substance to change 1°C. Water has a high specific heat so it heats and cools slowly. Snow tends 
to reflect most of the radiation back into the atmosphere, and depending on the condition of the 
sky, can produce different effects. The significance of temperature cannot be underestimated in 
forecasting, as it is directly connected with pressure and wind. 
Hygrometers (or sling psychrometers) are instruments used for measuring the moisture 
content in the atmosphere, referred to as humidity. Knowing the humidity can help predict 
precipitation, fog, clouds and other water-based conditions. The purpose of a hygrometer is to 
establish how much the atmosphere must be cooled before condensation occurs, which is called 
its dew point. When there is increased moisture in the air at surface level and a decrease in 
clouds, for instance, it is reasonable to expect the formation of fog. Increased moisture and 
increased clouds tend to create precipitation, while clouds are formed from upper level moisture 
as water particles gather around neutral particles, or “condensation nuclei,” such as dust. 
Anemometers with attached tachometers are used to determine wind speed (movement of 
air) across a horizontal surface, which is reported in miles per hour. The standard anemometer 
used until the early twentieth century was comprised of four hemispheric cups attached vertically 
to four horizontal arms and mounted to a pole which then “harnesses” the wind. In 1926, 
Canadian meteorologist John Patterson discovered that a three-cup anemometer was able to 
measure wind speeds and gusts more accurately. Slight modifications made by Brevoort and 
15 
 
Joiner in 1935 produced wind measurements with less than 3% error. During WWII, wind vanes 
were used to determine the direction the wind was coming from, sixteen-point compasses were 
used when relaying the information for surface winds and a 360-degree scale for upper level 
winds.  
Four basic forces affect the direction of air movement. The first, pressure gradient force, 
is the movement of air based on differences in pressure created by variation in heating. It dictates 
that air moves from areas of high pressure to those of low pressure. The second is Coriolis force, 
based upon the earth’s rotation, which causes an apparent deflection of air movement to the right 
in the Northern Hemisphere and left in the Southern Hemisphere. The amount of deflection is 
based on geographic location. There is zero Coriolis at the equator and maximum deflection at 
the poles. The third includes centrifugal and centripetal force, according to which the direction of 
air directly correlates with the speed and radius of the gradient. Centrifugal force is outward 
momentum of air when rotating around the radius and centripetal refers to inward motion. 
Finally, frictional force posits that the greater the friction, the more wind speed is reduced, which 
consequently alters the direction of the air when taking into account other factors affecting air 
movement. However, friction can be neglected in the upper levels due to less interaction with the 
surface. This causes winds to be much stronger with altitude since the frictional force is greatly 
reduced. Friction is typically considered up to 1,500 feet above ground level (AGL) on flat 
surfaces and up to 6,000 feet AGL in mountainous terrain.  
 Visual observation of weather in a given area is just as important as the instruments used 
to measure atmospheric conditions. Cloud heights, types and coverage are observed and reported 
during weather observations. The height of a cloud, or, more specifically, the height of the base 
of a cloud, can be calculated by comparing it to prominent objects, such as towers and 
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mountains, for which the height is already known. For an exact determination of height, a pilot-
balloon can be launched. This involves a tripod-mounted theodolite and a hydrogen-filled 
balloon. Tracing the balloon through the theodolite gives observers both the exact height of the 
clouds and directions of the wind in the upper atmosphere. Knowing the three main types of 
clouds can also help determine height of the cloud base. Stratus clouds are considered to be low-
level clouds, alto clouds are mid-level and cirrus are considered high-level clouds.  
 Once the heights are ascertained, the observer reports the base of a cloud to the nearest 
hundred feet. Total cloud coverage, which is inclusive of all layers of clouds, is reported in 
tenths of the total visible sky. “Clear skies” means there are no clouds below 12,000 feet. Few 
clouds mean that less than one-tenth of the sky is covered by clouds. One-tenth to five-tenths is 
considered scattered coverage, six-tenths to nine-tenths is broken coverage, and greater than 
nine-tenths is overcast.18 The cloud ceiling is defined as the height above ground level of the 
lowest broken or overcast cloud layer. Since clouds are generally layered at different heights, it 
is important to calculate the total cloud coverage. As an example, if there are low-level clouds 
covering three-tenths of the sky, a middle layer covering three-tenths and higher layer covering 
one-tenth, then the total cloud coverage would be seven-tenths (broken cloud coverage) with the 
ceiling height being the height of the middle layer.  
 Visibility – and the atmospheric phenomena affecting it – is another significant element 
of weather observation. Visibility is the greatest distance that can be seen unobstructed in a 
horizontal view. A maximum visibility of 10 miles is coded as “unrestricted.” For any distance 
less than that, a report of what is restricting the visibility is needed. Constructing a visibility chart 
is helpful in this situation. In the daytime, calculating the distance of known objects is optimal 
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and at night, using distant lights as markers is required. It is common to have varying visibilities 
in different directions. If this is the case, the observer reports the differences and includes what is 
obstructing the visibility. This can include anything from haze, fog and smoke to various forms 
of precipitation.19  
Forecasting from Observations 
 Initially standard observations were taken twice a day, increasing to four times a day 
during WWII, with the exception of “special” observations, which were taken as needed. To be 
considered a special observation, elements such as reduced or new ceiling height, the beginning, 
ending or change of precipitation or an increase or decrease in visibility must be noted. 
Observations generally contained five coded groups which were compiled in a linear format. 
Group 1 was the identification group, containing the station identifier, classification of the report 
(which pertained mainly to pilots) and type of report. Group 2 was the condition of the sky, 
which included ceiling height, sky condition and visibility. Group 3 contained special weather 
conditions such as precipitation or obstructions to visibility. Group 4 listed the properties of the 
atmosphere: pressure, temperature, wind direction and speed. Group 5 included miscellaneous 
data and additional remarks that the observer felt important to aviators and forecasters to 
identify, such as dangers in the area that are deemed a threat, including lightning or 
thunderstorms. An example of a WWII teletype weather observation is given in Figure 1. 
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 Observations were received by the forecaster who, after decoding the data, would plot the 
information on a synoptic map for aviators to look at and complete their own forecasts.20 Ideally, 
the forecaster would receive more than one observation from the area in order to keep an eye on 
trending weather patterns and extrapolate a forecast for the area. Forecasts could range from a 6-
hour outlook to a week from the time of forecast. The accuracy of the forecast is diminished 
significantly the further in time it covers. Since the weather observations are not exact, it is 
difficult to predict the weather conditions accurately. Conditions that would normally produce 
one outcome, would not necessarily produce an identical outcome again. With that said, 
persistence is one of the best tools a forecaster can have. Knowledge of an area’s climatology 
and its localized weather patterns and terrain also helps bolster the accuracy of forecasts. 
 In Yugoslavia, for example, the OSS-led weathermen were strategically arranged in order 
to provide the best coverage of the terrain, often along the flight path of sorties providing tactical 
air support to Yugoslavia’s resistance group and targeting Axis-controlled factories in Romania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria. Three teams were deployed on the windward side of the Dinaric 
Alps, one team in Slovenia, one in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other in Montenegro, effectively 
spanning the mountain range. The fourth team was located on the island of Vis off the Dalmatian 
Coast. Although it is unclear whether these teams had contact with each other, it is known that 
                                                 
20. Synoptic maps are maps of a region or country that show large scale systems, such as fronts, and 
provides the person with a “big picture” scenario of conditions in the area. It is useful in predicting weather and also 
comprehensive when adding localized observations and other weather elements.  
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their observations were sent back to Bari, Italy, to the OSS headquarters, where a forecaster was 
able to combine the data to produce a forecast for the region.21 The forecast was then briefed to 
the flying squadrons based in Brindisi, Italy, to inform the commanders of the current and 
forecasted conditions in the area. 
 The teams in Yugoslavia were likely able to utilize the weather observations to produce 
their own forecasts through single station analysis. This would have been difficult, since they did 
not possess the other teams’ information, yet, having the same skillset as those at the 
headquarters, they could have monitored the atmospheric changes, applied the localized weather 
effects, and produced forecasts of similar accuracy.  
Developments in Meteorology and the Establishment of Military Weather 
The development of military weather unit in WWII was made possible by the 
incorporation of the newest weather techniques into post-World War I military strategy. Due to 
lack of funds following WWI and the stagnant thinking of weather forecasting, the Weather 
Bureau fell behind its European counterparts. Norwegian meteorologist Jacob Bjerknes of the 
Bergen School developed the revolutionary, three-dimensional notion of “Polar front theory,” a 
term used to describe the boundaries of differing air masses whose movements could be 
predicted through mathematical calculations.22 In 1926, Bjerknes’ student, Swedish 
meteorologist Carl-Gustav Rossby, arrived at the U.S. Weather Bureau via a research grant, 
bringing with him the knowledge of the Norwegian theory of air masses and their movement. In 
December 1927, Rossby was able to demonstrate the importance of the new model to aviation 
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 when he provided the forecast for Charles A. Lindbergh’s 27-hour flight from Bolling Field, 
Washington D.C. to Mexico City.23  
A year later, Rossby was appointed lead instructor at MIT, which began offering a one-
year meteorological curriculum based on the Norwegian air mass model. Cal Tech soon joined 
the ranks of MIT as a leading school in the field of meteorology. Due to growing anti-Semitism 
in Europe, Hungarian aerospace physicist Dr. Theodore von Kármán emigrated to the U.S. in 
1930 to assume the chair of Cal Tech’s Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory. At the same time, 
geophysicist Dr. Beno Gutenberg, a former German WWI army meteorologist, accepted a 
professorship at the school. Under their tutelage, Irving P. Krick studied meteorology and in 
1933 became the head of the department. MIT and Cal Tech were thus established as clear 
leaders in the field, thanks to these Western European imports. Under the leadership and 
persuasion of Rossby, three more universities were added to the pre-WWII training of 
forecasters. By the beginning of the war, New York University, the University of Chicago and 
the University of California, Los Angeles, rounded off what was considered the “Big Five” 
which were responsible for wartime weather training. 24 
Also integral to establishing military weather was the reorganization of the existing 
structure of the Weather Bureau and its training schools so that all weather services fell under a 
single command with standardized training. This restructuring happened concurrently with the 
development of MIT’s and Cal Tech’s meteorological programs. The Signal Corps 
Meteorological Service (Army) and Air Corps (Air Force) were the military extensions of the 
Weather Bureau and, following the end of WWI, they consisted of only eleven officers and 
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forty-nine enlisted men.25 This was hardly enough men to support Brigadier General William 
“Billy” Mitchell’s newly founded Air Service, which he maintained would be a vital military 
force in the coming years. Initially operating as two separate entities, the Air Corps and Air 
Service were integrated by the Air Corps Act of 1926, relieving the stress placed on the Signal 
Corps for handling all weather ground operations. After a series of weather-related aircraft 
accidents in 1934-1935, the Air Corps took over the air mail service by presidential decree. FDR 
then placed the supply and training of weather personnel under the control of the Air Corps. 
Tactical and combat missions were then subsumed under a new organization, the General 
Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force.26  
Consolidated Training for the Military  
          In 1920 the Signal Corps established a weather school for enlisted observers and enlisted 
and officer forecasters at Camp Alfred Vail, NJ.27 After the establishment of the Air Corps in 
1926, weather training was moved to Fort Monmouth, NJ. Trainees attended the 4½ month 
course and only a handful of officers were selected to receive advanced weather training at MIT 
or Cal Tech each year. In 1937, when the Air Corps assumed responsibility for training 
weathermen, the locations shifted again. There was a weather course for enlisted observers and 
forecasters at Patterson Field, OH, from 1937-1939. A subsequent split beginning in 1939 
relocated observer training to Scott Field, IL, while forecaster training remained at Patterson. By 
the end of 1939, the Air Corps had fully trained 30 officers and 388 enlisted men.28 In a final 
attempt to consolidate and standardize training, enlisted weather forecasting and observing 
schools were relocated permanently to a single location. A three-month school was established at 
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Chanute, Illinois, where trainees received university-equivalent classes in mathematics, physics 
and other subjects.  
In 1937, the Air Corps focused on aviation weather as more aircraft were being 
developed that could fly higher, faster and longer than previously. To support these needs, it 
became even more crucial to supply accurate upper air wind readings, atmospheric pressure 
changes and climatic data that would alert the pilots to any dangerous atmospheric occurrences 
that could result in mission failure. At this point, the military proposed combining weather 
personnel from the Signal Corps and the Air Corps, all but ending the Signal Corps’ role of 
meteorological support. This combined branch, the Air Corps Weather Service, concentrated on 
flexible weather training in diverse environments as war loomed in the not so distant future in 
Europe. By the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, the Air Corps boasted a total of 400 weather 
officers and 2,000 enlisted men. Entering WWII, the Air Corps Weather Service was renamed 
the Joint Meteorological Committee (comprised of the Weather Bureau, Navy and Army 
meteorologists) and was placed under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1942, the Joint 
Meteorological Committee divided among its three branches, one of which became the Army Air 
Forces (AAF) Weather Service. 
Advancing Weather for Aviation Support 
 Prior to American involvement in WWI, the connection between aviation and 
meteorology was still in its infancy, but both pilots and meteorologists realized the importance of 
weather to the future of aviation. Pilots relied heavily on surface observations, paying close 
attention to wind speed and direction, and were able to obtain limited upper air data. When 
America entered WWI, the use of military aviation expanded, and with that, funding from the 
Army Appropriations Act of 1918 increased the Weather Bureau’s operations to obtain upper air 
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data and produce daily forecasts.29 The advent of telecommunications led to the transmission of 
weather data to greater areas, yet, the Weather Bureau’s initiatives still fell drastically short of 
supporting aviators, mainly because of limited communications to the pilots.  
 The result was devastating. Without proper communication and manned observation 
posts, it was almost impossible to relay critical information to aviators, leading to a series of 
crashes. With the mounting death toll, aviators looked to Congress to support the growing 
weather industry. On May 20, 1926, Congress passed the Air Commerce Act, which dictated that 
the Weather Bureau: 
(a) … furnish such weather reports, forecasts, warnings, and advices as may be 
required to promote the safety and efficiency of air navigation in the United States 
and above the high seas, particularly upon civil airways designated by the 
Secretary of Commerce under the authority of law as routes suitable for air 
commerce, and (b) for such purposes to observe, measure, and investigate 
atmospheric phenomena, and establish meteorological offices and stations.30 
 
The Air Commerce Act allowed for greater funding to the Weather Bureau, which resulted in an 
increase in weather stations at airports. In 1926, there were no weather stations at airports, but by 
1930 there were fifty, manned twenty-four hours, seven days a week, and two-hundred and fifty 
additional stations reporting intermittent visual observations. Though this was a start, aviation 
continued to outgrow meteorological support.  
 Improvements in communications in 1932 occurred when sheet-model teletype replaced 
the tape model and, in 1937, the speed of transmission was increased from forty to sixty words 
per minute.31 By 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Authority gathered weather reports from the 
Weather Bureau and transmitted the information out via radio every thirty minutes. Two-way 
communications allowed pilots to contact weather stations for updates. One other major 
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deficiency was rectified with the introduction of the radio meteorograph (later called 
radiosondes). This device was able to record and transmit temperatures, pressure and humidity in 
the upper atmosphere. Using the same concept of pilot-balloons, it recorded data up to a height 
of 50,000 feet and relayed the raw data through electrical impulses to a receiving station on the 
ground. Once received, the information was plotted on a thermodynamic map to interpret the 
vertical profile of the atmosphere. Recognizing the import of such advancements, in 1943 the 
Joint Meteorological Committee (JMC) briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that the top 
research priority should be upper-level forecasting and techniques for long-range forecasts to 
support aviation missions.32 
Aviation 
          Military aviation expanded significantly when the U.S. entered WWI, stimulating the need 
for upper-air observation and the issuance of daily aviation and special forecasts tailored to 
mission-specific objectives. Air power proved effective during the war and military and civilian 
agencies sought to expand the role of aviation thereafter, which in turn required more substantial 
meteorology in the military. Advances in communication and forecast techniques allowed for the 
relay of more accurate and precise forecasts. In 1929, ceiling heights and visibility were now 
included in airway reports. Upper air maps displaying wind speed and direction from the surface 
to 13,000 feet were used starting in 1933 and, to keep up with European efforts, the Weather 
Bureau began to issue aviation maps twice a day to pilots in 1935. By 1940, new 100-gram pilot 
balloons replaced the 30-gram balloons used for the deployment of radiosondes. The larger 
balloons accelerated the ascension rate from 600 to 1,000 feet per minute, allowing data to be 
transmitted more quickly and collected from higher altitudes (52,000-60,000 feet). 
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 With FDR’s announcement in 1940 that 50,000 aircraft would be added to the Army Air 
Forces, the JMC focused meteorological training on four specific areas. 33 The first of these was 
called analysis/atlas, which involved reanalyzing forecast maps after including all available 
weather data. This was done without a time constraint so forecasters could more thoroughly 
study atmospheric patterns and its results. The second was climatology. This was comprised of 
collecting all available weather observations and forecasts from countries in which the military 
foresaw itself engaged in future operations. Climatology determined long-term averages of 
relevant weather elements. This was especially helpful to military planners in selecting base of 
operation airfields and also in choosing the optimal times to launch missions. Tropical 
meteorology was also a high priority since it was an area of mostly unknown weather patterns to 
U.S. troops in the Pacific Theater. Lastly, upper-air data became a new focus, which allowed 
forecasters to determine the dynamic structure of the atmosphere by studying circulation 
patterns, heightening the accuracy and lengthening the range of forecasts.  
During flight school, aviators were trained in basic weather elements and its impact on 
missions. Two of the most significant atmospheric conditions, especially to pilots and aircrew, 
are temperature and moisture. These elements and its changes served as indicators for both wind 
and pressure; as noted earlier, wind is controlled by pressure and pressure is controlled by 
temperature. Knowledge of these basic elements, with a limited understanding of atmospheric 
and thermodynamics, can determine a mission’s success or failure. 
At the start of WWII, meteorology had transformed from a scientific netherworld of 
approximation to a more concrete methodology, which allowed pilots during the war a greater  
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chance of success. This, despite the fact that they were told not to have “blind confidence” in 
everything a forecaster briefs.34 
Weather Effects in the Mediterranean 
 The topography of the Mediterranean area and the geographic locations of Allied forces 
and the enemy within the region were far from ideal for both meteorologists and aviators. During 
1944’s Operation BUNGHOLE, the main Allied airfields were in Bari and Brindisi, both located 
on the eastern coastline of Italy with the Apennines Mountains to their west, their peaks reaching 
upwards to 9,500 feet. After crossing east over the Adriatic Sea into Yugoslavia, pilots had to 
contend with the Dinaric Alps, which ran the length of the country near the coastline and reached 
a maximum height of 8,900 feet. This created localized wind conditions accompanied by other 
atmospheric hazards, a constant threat to aviators in the area. 
  Small-scale, thermally induced wind systems generally occurred in the region of the 
Dinaric Alps due to the terrain. Sea (Lake) breeze occurs during the daytime when the earth’s 
temperature is at its warmest, generally a few hours after sunrise. Overland, convection draws 
upward, creating a lower pressure system. Since the water is typically cooler than the land, the 
air does not rise as quickly, causing it to move from the higher pressure system to the lower one, 
in this case, from the sea to land. The difference in air density results in two opposing flows, one 
at the surface (sea breeze) and the return flow aloft. Increased wind speed and change of 
direction is common with this condition, along with increased humidity from the water. The rise 
of moisture through convection of the warm air leads to thunderstorms and other hazards. Land 
breeze is the opposite of sea breeze and occurs during the night. The process is reversed since the 
land cools more quickly during the evening and the water retains the heat longer.  
 A valley breeze is another localized condition that occurs due to the slope and terrain 
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differences associated with mountain systems. A daytime phenomenon, it occurs because of the 
heating of the valley floor, resulting in anabatic wind flow, which is the movement of warmer air 
up the mountainside. As the warmer air reaches the top, it is cooler than the surrounding 
atmosphere, sometimes resulting in convection, which can lead to the formation of clouds and 
rain. Mountain breeze is the opposite of valley breeze and takes place during the evening. Night 
time radiation cools the air on the sides of the mountain, resulting in the air becoming denser and 
thus sinking into the valley. The katabatic wind flow, the movement of cooler air downward, is 
typical in the Adriatic region and is referred to as the Bora. The Bora brings with it gusty 
conditions and colder temperatures. 
 Other conditions specific to the Balkan region are related to local orographic effects, 
which are produced by the four dominant wind patterns that occur over the Adriatic Sea.35 For 
Yugoslavia, when the air masses approach the coastline on the windward side, the warm air 
flowing over the Adriatic Sea begins to rise over the Dinaric Alps and starts to cool. This process 
induces significant cloud coverage, decreased visibility and increased precipitation as the air 
mass reaches the peaks. The precipitation can occur up to 25 miles on the leeward side of the 
range, depending on the stability of the atmosphere. The OSS weathermen in Operation 
BUNGHOLE were in prime position to report this phenomenon, which could produce impassible 
conditions for aircraft, along with diurnal cumulus formations producing a low cloud base that 
could also impair air missions. 
 Although this is not an all-inclusive list of weather conditions and patterns that impacted 
missions in the area, it serves as a general outline of the conditions with which OSS weathermen, 
pilots and commanders had to contend. Weather in the area changed rapidly, making conditions 
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hazardous for pilots during takeoffs, landings and en-route to their primary objectives. 
Unfortunately, the situation on the ground in Yugoslavia was just as dangerous. 
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CHAPTER 3 
YUGOSLAVIA: CHAOS AND CONFUSION 
The region that comprises the former Yugoslavia has long been fragmented and 
dominated by foreign powers. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw continuous 
exploitation of Slavic people by the Great Powers of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Against 
this backdrop, movements for an independent, unified South Slav nation began to take form. 
Sparked by European romantic notions of nationalism, these efforts attempted to bring together 
the South Slavic people by establishing a common language, Serbo-Croat, as a marker of a 
distinctive Slavic culture.36 In order to accomplish this, these prideful people had to break the 
chains with which the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires had bound them. 
The establishment of the Balkan League during 1912 marked the beginning of the 
formation of Yugoslavia (South-Slav) as an independent nation. During World War I, the newly-
formed Yugoslav Committee, consisting mostly of Croats, met in London in 1915 to discuss 
Slavic unification with the Allies. The Serbian Parliament, which at this point was in exile in 
Corfu, Greece, agreed with the Yugoslav Committee, and, in 1917, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes was established. This new alliance among Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia, did not take effect until 1918, after the collapse of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. The territory was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929.37 
The goal for this territory was to establish one nation joined together by ancestral blood, a 
common language and a shared historical culture. Long-standing distrust between Croats, 
Slovenes and the other nationalities began to surface, however, as the Slavic people realized their 
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nation would be controlled by the Serbian House of Karadordević, the ruling dynasty at the time. 
Even with the consensual agreement for a constitutional monarchy, the non-Serbian nation-states 
feared their desire for self-identification would not be met. A fragmented nation, once founded 
on the principles of nationalism, now realized the nostalgic ideology of past glory during the 
Middle Ages with Byzantium, would not work in this new world order. This became especially 
clear during World War II, following the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941. After 11 
days of resistance, the Royal Yugoslav government surrendered and fled in exile to Britain, 
which led to the uprisings of Dragoljub "Draža" Mihailović and Josip Broz Tito against Nazi 
occupation. Mihailović and his Chetniks were loyal to the abdicated royal government while Tito 
and his Partisans were Communists fighting against the Axis and the former Yugoslav regime. 
This chapter will investigate the period spanning the creation of Yugoslavia as an 
independent state through the Nazi invasion and exile of the Yugoslav monarch, and finally to 
the uprising of the Chetnik and Partisan resistance movements, which were supported by British 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American OSS in helping defeat the Nazi 
occupation. 
The Balkan League 
King Peter I Karadordević took the throne on June 15, 1903 and served as the last King 
of Serbia. He modified the constitution of 1889 and issued the constitution of 1903, which was 
based on democratic and liberal ideas, making Serbia a parliamentary and constitutional 
monarchy. The reforms, led mainly by Nikola P. Pašić and the People’s Radical Party, spanned 
Serbian cultural, social, economic and cultural realms. King Peter sought Serbian democracy and 
independence in foreign affairs. He also sought unification with the South Slavs, which he 
attempted with a series of military and economic treaties between Serbia and Bulgaria. They 
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were joined later by Greece and Montenegro in the formation of the Balkan League. The main 
purpose was to eliminate Ottoman rule in the Balkan Peninsula and to unite all the South Slavs 
under one nation.  
The Balkan League’s quest for unification did not come without conflict. The First 
Balkan War broke out on October 8, 1912. The Ottomans, who wanted to defend all their lands 
in the region, spread themselves too thin and, through a series of coordinated attacks by the 
Balkan League, were defeated. On May 30, 1913, with the signing of the Treaty of London, the 
Ottomans were deprived of all their territories in Europe and their lands were divided among the 
victors. Bulgaria, believing it did not receive a fair share of territory in Macedonia, aligned itself 
against its former allies, initiating the Second Balkan War. This war lasted from July 29 – 
August 10, ending with the Treaty of Bucharest, in which Bulgaria not only lost lands to her 
former allies gained during the first war, but also territory to the Ottomans. The results of the 
Balkan Wars included not only territorial gain for the Balkan League, but also a boost in 
confidence for the South-Slav movement.38 
World War I 
King Peter was viewed by many as the liberator of the South Slavs, though he 
specifically promoted the idea of a Serbian-controlled Yugoslavia. He accomplished a great deal 
in unifying the Slavic people, but not without resistance. On June 28, 1914, the Black Hand, a 
secret military society within the Serbian Army, led by Captain Dragutin Dimitrijević  and 
consisting of the officers who assassinated Serbia’s previous ruler, Alexander I Obrenović and 
his family, sponsored the assassination of Austria-Hungary’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 
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Sarajevo.39 Backed by Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey (Central Powers), the Hapsburg Empire 
declared war on Serbia a month later, as Russia, France and Great Britain (Allied Powers) rallied 
to her aid, thus beginning World War I.  
During World War I, the newly-formed Yugoslav Committee, consisting mostly of 
Croats, met in London in 1915 to discuss with the Allies the creation of a unified Slavic nation. 
The government of Serbia was in exile in Corfu, Greece, and so the Serbian Parliament met with 
the Yugoslav Committee in 1917, forming the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
commonly called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.40 Thus, from the ashes of revolution and war, 
“Yugoslavia was … born in the chaos and blood,” as the Allies proved victorious on November 
11, 1918. 41 
Interwar Period 
 On December 1, 1918, Peter I’s son, Prince-Regent Alexander I, proclaimed the 
formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. He became the first king of Yugoslavia 
after his father’s death in 1921. Alexander I, a respected military leader during the Balkan Wars 
and WWI, found himself with the daunting task of creating a political and economic 
supranational unity. Leaders of the individual republics, including their intellectual elites, were 
opposed to the constitution and felt that individual state-building should take precedence over 
nation-building.42 Gustav Krklec, a Croatian poet, described it best: 
We have neither a unified strong cultural activity inside the country, nor do we 
have a unified, healthy well-organized cultural propaganda abroad. That is, in  
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other words, a definite lack in the cultural atmosphere without which there is no 
initiative, no pride, and no desire for serious work.43 
 
One main reason for this discord was that the states, specifically Croatia, wanted a 
liberal-democratic constitution, as they were wary of a Serb-dominated government. Stjepan 
Radić (founder of the Croatian Peasant Party) and his followers continually opposed Serb 
centralism. Serb nationalists, with their centralized state constitution, faced resistance from the 
majority of the non-Serb states. Radić was assassinated in parliament on August 8, 1928, and 
things quickly spiraled out of control. Radić’s death ignited a firestorm of uprisings, including 
one by Ante Pavelić’s Croatian ultranationalist terrorist group, the Ustaša. Then, on  January 6, 
1929, Alexander I dissolved the constitution, suspended parliment, changed the name of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and declared a 
dictatorship.44  
 Alexander I issued a new constitution in 1934, which transferred all executive power to 
himself, including the ability to appoint half of the upper house. The remainder was elected by 
the public. For all intents and purposes, the constitution established an authoritarian. This further 
alienated Alexander I from the non-Serb people he ruled; he even lost a majority of support from 
the Serbian nationalists. By the time he realized his dictatorship was in ruin, he was assassinated 
by an Ustaša-connected Macedonian in 1934, under the hit-for-hire direction of Facist Italy. 
Alexander I's son, Peter II, was too young at the time to rule, so his cousin, Prince Paul, who saw 
himself as more Yugoslav than Serbian, became the Regent of Yugoslavia. This initiated a 
political regrouping, as Prince Paul attempted to reverse the dictatorship that Alexander I created 
in 1929. Two main issues plagued Prince Paul’s rule: the pressure applied by Croatia for 
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independence from the Yugoslav state; and the Axis powers’ exploitation of the persistent 
internal conflicts in Yugoslavia. 
 The Serbian-Croatian relationship, which helped unite Yugoslavia, was ruined with the 
assassination of Radić. Vladimir Maček, Radić’s successor as the leader of the Croatian Peasant 
Party, called for Croatian semi-autonomy within the state of Yugoslavia in 1934. In an attempt 
assuage Maček’s concerns, Prince Paul addressed Croatians’ concerns by combining two of the 
nine regional provinces (banovine) that made up Yugoslavia to form the Banate of Croatia. 
Yugoslav premier Dragiša Cvetković and Maček signed the agreement on August 26, 1939, 
which outlined Croatia’s borders.45 Although still subordinated to the Yugoslav government, 
Croatia was the only banovine to which Prince Paul gave special concessions. This, as Croatia 
saw it, was a step closer to a truly unified South-Slav nation, with equal representation and 
recognition of separate ethnic groups within the whole. But it came too late, as the Axis was 
already encroaching on Yugoslavia. 
  During the early stages of WWII, Yugoslavia attempted to maintain a policy of 
neutrality with the Axis powers, believing the Allies’ military presence on the western front 
would keep the Nazis contained. However, on June 22, 1940, with the surrender of France, the 
power shifted in favor of the Axis and its attention shifted towards the east, forcing Yugoslavia 
to shift its priorities from upholding a balance of power in the Balkans to a defensive posture 
against the Axis. When Italy entered the war on the same day France capitulated, Benito 
Mussolini promised Italy would take no action against “those with whom it shared land or sea 
frontiers,” specifically referring to Yugoslavia and Greece.46 However, on October 28, seeing 
Hitler’s military and territorial successes, Mussolini invaded Greece, which included the town of 
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Salonika, a shipping port used extensively by Yugoslavia for trade. This conflict, called the Italo-
Greek War, marked the beginning of Yugoslavia’s entrance into the war. Prince Paul, honoring 
the Balkan Entente, sent troops to the southern frontier and supplied the Greeks with war 
materials, which helped defeat the Italians and push them back into Albania.47 
 Frustrated with what he considered Mussolini’s ineptness, Hitler refused to help the 
Italians in this battle. At the time, he was preparing for an all-out war against the Soviet Union, 
for which he needed raw material located in the Balkans. With the promise of protection from 
the Russians, both Hungary and Romania signed the Tripartite Pact in November 1940.48 Hitler 
knew he needed Yugoslavia as well, not only for its resources, but also for “egotistical … 
reasons.”49 Prince Paul, having met with Hitler on several occasions, repeatedly refused to sign 
the Tripartite Pact both to maintain neutrality and satisfy the will of the people who did not want 
Germany or Italy to occupy their lands. Hitler, knowing the importance of Salonika to 
Yugoslavia, offered the Yugoslavians the port and protection from the Italians, as well as 
promising that no German troops would enter the nation if they signed. Still reluctant to sign, 
Prince Paul looked for a pledge of military support from the United States, France and Britain in 
case Hitler decided to invade the country. The situation grew grimmer when Bulgaria signed the 
Pact on March 1, 1941. Now Yugoslavia was surrounded on all sides by the Axis. With nowhere 
to turn, and acknowledging that Yugoslavia alone could not defend itself from an attack, Prince 
Paul sent his prime minister to sign the Pact in Vienna on March 25, 1941. 
 The British kept a keen eye on the political developments in Yugoslavia with the intent to 
incite a revolution if the current regime capitulated to Germany. The British wanted to replace 
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the Yugoslav government with one that opposed the Axis. The British plans for a coup d'état in 
fact began a year earlier with the formation of the SOE under the leadership of Hugh Dalton. 
When Dalton learned that Yugoslavia signed the Pact, he signaled his agents in Belgrade to ‘use 
all means [necessary] to raise a revolution.’50  The coup was initiated in the early hours of March 
27, 1941, by ranking Royal Yugoslav Air Force officers, as Prince Paul and his cabinet were on 
their way to Belgrade. By noon the same day, the conspirators announced over the radio that 
Peter II Karadordević, the heir to the throne, had assumed control of the government. The news 
was met with great joy from the Serbs, who filled the streets that afternoon chanting and 
cheering pro-Allied messages mixed with nationalist claims for independence. Hitler heard the 
news the same day, and despite the promise that this change in leadership would not affect 
Yugoslavia’s relationship with Germany, Hitler issued Directive 25 – the order to attack 
Yugoslavia.  
 The invasion of Yugoslavia came on April 6, 1941, with an overwhelming aerial 
bombardment by the Luftwaffe on Belgrade and a ground assault from Bulgaria. Soon after, 
Hungary, Romania and Italy joined in. It took eleven days for the Axis to bring Yugoslavia to its 
knees. On April 17, 1941, an armistice was signed for the unconditional surrender of Yugoslavia 
as Peter II and his cabinet members fled the country. The remaining government and military 
officials met the Germans in Belgrade to discuss the terms of the armistice. Many Serbs refused 
to surrender and fled to the mountains, creating resistance networks engaged in guerilla warfare 
against the Axis occupation. The most notable of these groups was led by a staunch Serbian 
loyalist, Colonel Draža Mihailović, who was the leader of the Chetnik Detachment’s of the 
Yugoslav Army, or Chetniks. At about the same time, Croatian Josip Broz Tito of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia issued a pamphlet calling on all people to unite against the 
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occupation. In these early years of Yugoslavian engagement in the war, Tito and Mihailović 
worked with the same goal in mind: fighting the German occupation. In years to come, however, 
these groups not only fought their common enemy, but began to take arms against each other. 
The internal fighting later caused issues as the Allies switched their support from Mihailović to 
Tito following the meeting of the leaders of the Allied powers on November 28, 1943 at the 
Soviet Embassy in Tehran to discuss their combined strategy. The primary outcome of the 
conference was the commitment to open up a second front against the Nazis; however, the first 
military conclusion was that “the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and 
equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations.”51 This conclusion 
paved the road for the first test of OSS weathermen during the war. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN AND THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
In July 1940, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox urged FDR to send an envoy to Britain 
as an informal observer to report on how the British were holding up against the Germans. 
Colonel William “Wild Bill” Donovan, Knox’s close friend and decorated WWI hero, was 
selected for the assignment. Upon his return, he reported to FDR that the British armed forces’ 
morale was high and that it was able to protect Britain against German attacks. Donovan, due to 
his standing as a war hero, was also privy to Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) espionage 
and intelligence gathering activities, a privilege never held before by any American. This 
unparalleled access led Donovan to realize the need for a similar intelligence organization in the 
U.S. Following several more trips to Europe, including to the Mediterranean arena, Donovan, 
with the support of the British, was able to convince the president of the necessity for such an 
agency.52 Unwilling to commit fully at the time, FDR established the Office of Coordinator of 
Information (COI) in July 1941, with Donovan at the helm. A civilian agency, the mission of the 
COI was to collect and analyze intelligence information not otherwise done so by the military or 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Following U.S. entry into war, Roosevelt, with much 
persistence from Donovan, created the OSS on June 13, 1942, to wage unorthodox warfare 
against the enemy. This also led to the OSS being the central hub for all military intelligence 
organizations.  
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William “Bill” Donovan: The Early Years 
 Born on New Year’s Day 1883 to Timothy and Anna Donovan, William Joseph Donovan 
was the first of four children. The family was second generation Irish-American, living in the 
slums of the First Ward in southwest Buffalo, New York. His parents, both devoted Catholics 
and disciplinarians, instilled in their children the importance of hard work and education to 
achieving success in life. Donovan, who from an early age had issues controlling his violent 
temper, struggled with academics. He excelled, however, in sports and oration. Though he 
thought of becoming a priest – typical for a son of Irish Catholic immigrants – Donovan was 
persuaded by his religious mentor that his oratory skills suited the legal profession.53 He attended 
Columbia College in New York City in 1903, excelling once again in sports and speech, and 
graduated in 1905. He immediately enrolled in Columbia Law School, where one of his 
classmates was Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although Roosevelt and Donovan attended school 
together and often saw each other on campus, they had little else in common. Donovan, a 
staunch Republican from a lower class family, was not particularly fond of Roosevelt, a 
Democrat from a wealthy New York family who had attended the best schools and, most 
importantly, had a different outlook on politics. After two years at Columbia Donovan earned his 
law degree and returned home to Buffalo where he lived with his parents for over a year before 
joining the law firm of Love & Keating in 1909. 
 Donovan’s legal career quickly became a gateway to the social elite in New York.54 He 
was introduced to and befriended prominent politicians and businessmen. Following two years at 
Love & Keating, Donovan started his own law firm with Bradly Goodyear, a Columbia 
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classmate, to practice civil law. Three years later, they merged with John Lord O’Brien, a high-
brow lawyer in Buffalo, who had once advised William H. Taft. As Donovan’s reputation grew, 
so did his status. He landed lucrative contracts for the firm and was admitted into the prestigious 
Saturn and Greater Buffalo Clubs, where New York’s wealthiest individuals socialized.  
During the spring of 1912, Donovan and a group of men from the Saturn Club decided to 
form their own Army National Guard cavalry unit, Troop I.55 Referred to as the “Silk Stocking 
Boys” – although they preferred the name “Business Men’s Troop” – it started out as a riding 
and camping club that grew in numbers as the members wrote their own bylaws, separated 
enlisted men from officers, and elected their own leaders. Donovan was named captain of the 
troop and read extensively on military strategy, eventually taking Army classes on combat 
tactics. In four years, the club grew to over one hundred cavalrymen, with close to forty still 
being trained, and an increasing list of those who wanted to join. Their impressive numbers 
caught the attention of the State Department. In 1916, Donovan was commissioned by the 
Rockefeller Foundation as one of its representatives to Great Britain and Germany. He and 
others helped pave the way for the foundation’s War Relief effort by shipping food and clothing 
to Belgium, Serbia and Poland. This gave Donovan an opportunity to see the war first hand as he 
traveled the area and saw the battlefields. His business was cut short, however, as his cavalry 
unit was ordered to report to Texas under the command of General John “Black Jack” Pershing’s 
expeditionary forces, which were hunting Pancho Villa and his band. Spending less than a year 
in Texas, “Troop I” saw little action, spending more time dealing with the swamp infested area 
of McAllen, Texas, than actually fighting the Mexicans. Donovan was promoted to major and his 
unit returned to Buffalo in March 1917. 
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“Wild Bill” Donovan: From Lawyer to War Hero  
 Upon his return, Donovan promptly joined the 69th “Irish” Regiment of New York City 
in preparation for the U.S.’s imminent entrance into the war. Donovan was recruited by Francis 
Duffy, an Irish priest, to lead the regiment’s 1st Battalion. The Battalion was redesignated the 
165th when it moved to Long Island and became a part of the 42nd Rainbow Division with 
Douglas MacArthur as its Chief of Staff. In October, 1917, the battalion received orders and 
boarded the Tunisian passenger liner to Europe. Arriving in November, Donovan trained his men 
rigorously. For example, following a three-mile obstacle course in full gear, his men collapsed 
on the ground, much to his dismay. Standing over his troops, Donovan shouted at them, asking 
what was wrong with them as he carried the same weight and was older than them. A soldier in 
the back of the pack (who was never identified) shouted back, “But hell, we aren’t as wild as you 
are, Bill!”56 The name Wild Bill stuck from that point on.  
Donovan’s actions during the war were nothing short of heroic. Wounded three times in 
action, he was awarded the top four military decorations during his service, including the Medal 
of Honor for his actions from October 14-15, 1918 near the French town of Landres-et Saint-
Georges.57 The town was part of the Kriemhilde Stellung, the southern portion of the Hindenburg 
Line that stretched across France. Although Donovan was injured before the 42nd could break 
through the German defenses, news of his actions that day and throughout the war circulated 
stateside, garnering much attention from the political elite in New York.58 Promoted to Colonel, 
Donovan returned to a grateful New York on April 21, 1919, as the most decorated U.S. soldier 
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of WWI.59 He was honored with a key to the city and led a parade down Fifth Avenue with his 
unit. 
After his military successes, Donovan returned to the life of a lawyer despite some talk of 
a potential political future. He was not interested at this time; however, that would soon change. 
Before too long, he began to travel abroad in an attempt to secure new clients for his firm. He 
toured Japan, Korea and China, where he fervently took notes on attitudes towards the United 
States while receiving political intelligence during private meetings with the countries’ leaders. 
During his travels, the American ambassador in Tokyo asked him to travel to Siberia with Major 
General William S. Graves to assess the White Russian government and its internal affairs and 
then proceed to a six-month excursion in Europe. Donovan, who started the trip as solely a 
lawyer, finished it as a lawyer and a fact-finder, returning to the United States with over 200 
pages of information gathered from his conversations about the socio-economic conditions of the 
areas visited. This trip revealed to Donovan a gap in the U.S. intelligence system: there was a 
lack of collection and transmission of information between Washington and the field embassies. 
Back in the United States once again, Donovan finally turned his attention to domestic 
politics. He unsuccessfully ran as the Republican candidate for lieutenant governor of New York 
in 1922. In 1923, he was appointed as the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York, 
and one of his first actions was to raid the prestigious Saturn Club, where he was still a member, 
for violations against the Eighteenth Amendment.60 This move made Donovan unpopular in the 
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Buffalo region, but shined an even brighter light on him nationwide as a person who placed a 
sense of duty before self. Calvin Coolidge, who had become president after Warren G. Harding’s 
untimely death, recruited Donovan to run the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice. He stayed in that position for nearly a year until he moved to the Anti-Trust Division in 
March 1929.61 He was expected to become Attorney General; however, newly elected President 
Herbert Hoover offered him the govern-generalship in the Philippines, a job that he turned down 
and which was subsequently given to General Douglas MacArthur. Instead, Donovan went back 
to New York City and started a new law firm, continuing his travels overseas. In 1932, he ran as 
the Republican candidate for governor of New York, but lost to Herbert Lehman.  
Donovan’s interests slowly changed. Although he spent much of his energy speaking out 
against FDR and the New Deal, his focus steadily shifted to foreign affairs. On a return trip from 
England in 1935, Donovan wrote MacArthur concerning the Italian excursion into Ethiopia, 
prophesizing that Mussolini’s military actions might turn into a situation that would include 
more than just European and African nations.62 Donovan felt a trip to Ethiopia was warranted 
and he was subsequently sent by the War Department to Rome to meet with Mussolini by the 
end of the year. This was a turning point for Donovan. No longer was he merely a lawyer; he 
became an official advisor to the United States government on the situation in Europe. Mussolini 
gave Donovan unprecedented access in 1935 to his Italian army’s operations in Ethiopia. 
Reporting back to the War Department on the situation, he visited Germany in 1937 and was 
authorized to view the Reserved Artillery Officers’ training and was granted first-hand access to 
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the new tanks and artillery equipment. In 1938, he visited Czechoslovakia, Italy, and the 
Balkans, followed by a 1939 trip to Spain where he met with the commanding generals of fascist 
Spain who openly discussed their tactics. There Donovan was able to observe the Spanish Civil 
War taking place. 
 The former vice presidential nominee for the 1936 Republican Party, and a friend of 
Donovan’s, William Franklin Knox, was appointed as the Secretary of the Navy under FDR’s 
administration. It was Knox who bridged the political gap that existed between Donovan and 
FDR. He urged the president to send Donovan to England in 1940 to observe Britain’s Fifth 
Column and its readiness to survive a German attack. On the first of two trips, Donovan spoke at 
length to many prominent personnel, including King George VI, Winston Churchill, the head of 
the British SIS, Stewart Menzies, and John H. Godfrey, Britain’s head of the Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI). He was also given rare access to Britain’s secrets, such as radar, coastal 
defenses and intercept planes. Most notably, he was able to witness SIS’s use of covert warfare 
against the Axis, such as turning captured German spies into counterspies.63 During Donovan’s 
second trip to London in 1941, he was asked by FDR to evaluate the military importance of the 
Mediterranean area, including shipping routes. Following his experience as a first-hand witness 
to the Axis power, Donovan suggested to the president the creation of a centralized intelligence 
and information service that would carry out five special functions: “open, or white propaganda; 
secret or black, psychological-political warfare; sabotage and guerilla warfare; special 
intelligence; and strategic planning.” 64 
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The Office of the Coordinator of Information 
On May 31, 1941, Donovan drafted a memorandum entitled “Memorandum of 
Establishment of Service of Strategic Information,” in which he detailed the necessity of an 
intelligence agency, which eventually became the COI, the precursor to the OSS. The function of 
the organization was simple: to collect and evaluate pertinent information, both foreign and 
domestic, on the intention of the enemy. The COI would report directly to the president and be 
assisted by the heads of the existing intelligence agencies in the U.S. Knox pushed for the 
formation of the COI and Britain sent over Godfrey, the head of the ONI, who brought with him 
Ian Fleming as the representative of all the British services.65 Fleming served as the emissary 
between Britain and the U.S., helping to lay the ground work and provide the blueprints for the 
creation of the COI. On July 11, 1941, FDR, using his executive power and without conferring 
with the existing U.S. intelligence agencies, created the COI as a civilian agency with Donovan 
at its helm. 
The COI, as outlined by FDR, was to undertake measures to secure information vital to 
the defense of the nation. FDR also had four specific requirements: “first, plan strategy with the 
Chief of Staff, General Marshall; second, accept guidance from the White House on aims; third, 
discover who was planning post-war policy; fourth, control security for short-wave [radio] 
stations.”66 Donovan encountered two significant obstacles in building the COI from the ground 
up. First, he received no pay, and second, he encountered resistance from the existing military 
and civilian intelligence agencies. Despite these obstacles, Donovan recruited the best. He hired 
Harvard and Yale professors, famous American writers, Hollywood producers, Pulitzer Prize 
winners, members of the Civil Aeronautics Board and people from the Justice Department. Also, 
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he employed FDR’s son – James, and Teddy Roosevelt’s grandson – Kermit. The list of people 
recruited by Donovan became the “who’s who” in American industry and government following 
the war.  
Donovan created branches, divisions and units within the COI responsible for 
intelligence, research and special operations. The organization resembled a military hierarchy, 
with Donovan at the top. Robert Sherwood, playwright and presidential speechwriter, became 
the head of the Foreign Information Service, the first branch established in the COI. It was 
responsible for the preparation and dissemination of propaganda overseas. President of Williams 
College, Dr. James P. Baxter, became the head of the Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch, 
which was charged with gathering technological, economic, financial and psychological 
intelligence on varying countries. Positioned under the R&A was the Division of Special 
Information, which conducted studies and produced reports on countries spanning the globe, 
broken down into eight regional sections.67 WWI Colonel G. Edward "Ned" Buxton Jr., who 
wrote the first constitution for the founding of the American Legion, served as Donovan’s deputy 
and headed the Oral Intelligence Division.  
Special Activities Branch was one of the most important within the COI. Its recruits 
included Office of Naval Intelligence agent Wallace B. Phillips and G-2 Lt Col Robert A. 
Solborg. Phillips was responsible for forming a network of intelligence agents in enemy-held 
territory across the globe.68 Solborg went to Britain to study SOE methods and organization in 
October 1941 and returned three months later with the suggestion to separate Special Activities 
into two branches, Special Operations and Secret Intelligence. Realizing the difficulties the 
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British were facing with the formation of the SOE and its interaction with the existing SIS (MI-
6), Donovan complied. Secret Intelligence, led by David K.E. Bruce (SA/B), would obtain 
information outside the U.S. by utilizing undercover agents in enemy-held territories. M. Preston 
Goodfellow was placed in charge of Special Operations (SA/G).69 Its main objectives were to 
“organize and execute moral and physical subversions, including sabotage, fifth column 
activities and guerrilla warfare” against the enemy and to support local area commanders.70  
Although this discussion does not begin to cover the complexity of the COI and its 
multiple functions, the organization eventually grew to include around 60,000 personnel, 
including advisors and consultants, as well as COI agents. It came as no surprise that the existing 
U.S. intelligence agencies became resentful of its success. Notably, FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover expressed disapproval of the COI, and the Chief of Army Intelligence (G-2), General 
George V. Strong, refused to speak directly to Donovan. Strong feared that Donovan would keep 
vital intelligence from him which would hinder his wartime planning and he believed that 
Donovan would become too powerful in his current position. U.S. Air Force visionary General 
Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, expressed the overall situation between the COI and other intelligence 
agencies accurately: 
The old Army and the old Navy were not ready, in so far as their G -2 sections 
were concerned, for the new kind of war that was being forced upon them; the G-
2 men could not see over the hill to the necessity of establishing an agency for 
securing the new kind of information needed … to meet the requirements of land, 
sea and air forces in future wars …71 
 
Arnold’s observation rang true following the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces 
on December 7, 1941. Donovan launched an investigation and concluded that evidence on the 
                                                 
69. SA/B stood for Special Activities Bruce and SA/G was Special Activities Goodfellow, taking the last 
name of the person in charge of each unit. 
70. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, Vol 1, 80. 
71. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper, 1949), 535. 
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impending attack was there; however, the Army and Navy intelligence services failed to piece 
together the intercept messages. What was worse, in Donovan’s opinion, was that they had 
completely kept the COI out of the loop because of its civilian status. As the U.S. entered the 
war, Donovan recommended to FDR that the COI should be the center for intelligence for all 
branches of the military. On June 13, 1942, FDR issued the “Order Establishing the Office of 
Strategic Services.” The OSS, minus the Foreign Information Activities Division, now fell under 
the newly formed Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of the War Department. This made the OSS a 
wartime and military agency, as Donovan had always wanted. 
The Office of Strategic Services 
 Donovan was in London negotiating the Special Operations function of the COI with the 
SOE when the OSS was formed. Upon his return in June 1942, the OSS was operating on the 
basis of an interim order until proper paperwork was submitted by Donovan. The JCS requested 
an outline of the organization and its functions before the OSS could be recognized as a fully 
functional agency, which Donovan supplied. Along with the creation of the new organization, 
Donovan was promoted to Brigadier General. The OSS was thus tasked with supplying strategic 
services to the respective commands in the field. With such an ambiguous definition, the role of 
the OSS differed from region to region. In the European Theater, it was responsible for the 
preparation of large-scale amphibious landings. In the Far East, it oversaw the development of 
guerilla and subversive tactics and in the Mediterranean, it was charged with working alongside 
their Allied counterparts, the SOE. The first real test of the importance of the OSS came during 
Operation TORCH, the British-American invasion of French North Africa on November 8, 1942. 
Although the OSS was preparing for the invasion when it was still designated as the COI, 
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TORCH utilized every branch of the OSS as the Allies successfully regained control of the 
continent and prepared for its advance into Sicily and eventually Italy. 
 Aiding resistance movements became an important mission of the OSS within the 
Mediterranean area. The mission would mainly be assigned to the Special Operations (SO), 
Special Intelligence (SI) and Operational Groups (OG) of the OSS. The SO was responsible for 
sabotage and training guerrilla forces, the SI gathered and reported military intelligence by 
unorthodox means and the OG conducted irregular warfare against the enemy. The OSS joined 
the British services, which were already operating in the countries, with the British taking the 
lead due to the SO/SOE negotiations Donovan agreed to in June 1942. The OSS recruited U.S. 
service members in Washington and Cairo, Egypt to act as liaisons to Tito’s Partisans and 
Mihailović’s Chetnik resistance groups in Yugoslavia. The first SO officers parachuted into the 
enemy-controlled country on 18 and 22 August, 1943. Once in-country, they were under the 
command of the SOE and were required to use SOE communication equipment. Donovan, 
wanting to move out from under SOE control, traveled to Cairo in November 1943 to establish 
the rights of U.S. operatives in the Balkans. Thus, SO officers were redesignated to SI in order to 
circumvent the SO/SOE agreement. On December 26, 1943, the first two independently 
commanded OSS/Yugoslavia teams (ALUM and AMAZON) parachuted into Slovenia with their 
own radios.72 
 That same month, the OSS base of operations moved from Cairo to Bari, and the 
Fifteenth Air Force joined the Balkan Air Force in resupply missions and bombing raids. 
Intelligence poured out of the Balkans, from target locations to enemy movements, just as 
quickly as supplies were being dropped to aid the resistance. Jurisdiction issues regarding 
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operational control in Yugoslavia between the SOE and OSS were just as evident as the political 
conflict between the Partisans and Chetniks. However, the greater issue concerning the OSS 
weathermen occurred in the air as weather greatly hampered the Allied air missions. As military 
personnel crossed the Adriatic Sea from Italy and then the Dinaric Alps, which ran the length of 
Yugoslavia, weather intelligence played an important element in successful operations in the 
Balkans. In order to ensure the greatest possible success of Allied operations, a project 
codenamed BUNGHOLE was formed. It consisted of secret meteorological teams, each 
consisting of one forecaster, one observer and a radioman to infiltrate the area and established a 
weather network. They radioed weather reports every six hours back to Bari and then to the 19th 
Weather Squadron (WS) in Cairo. Once a forecast of the area was made, the weather report was 
disseminated and briefed to the flying units which supported not only the OSS missions, but all 
Allied missions in the Balkan region. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY: OPERATION BUNGHOLE 
 A memo from the OSS was sent to the U.S. 19th Weather Squadron (WS),73 the weather 
unit based out of Cairo, Egypt, regarding an upcoming recruitment briefing to attract weather 
observers and forecasters who were looking for a change of pace. According to S/Sgt Joseph J. 
Conaty Jr., a 19th WS observer, the OSS officer in charge simply told the men that they would 
be going into enemy territory after the successful completion of jump school. The recruitment 
turned out to be a success, as six officers and fifteen enlisted volunteered for detached service 
with the OSS.74 In early January 1944, the weathermen left for Ramad David, Palestine to attend 
the British Parachute Jump Course. The training times varied as multiple classes were taught 
simultaneously.75 According to Joseph Conaty, who was in the group of the first weathermen to 
graduate from the school, the training lasted nine days. The first five days consisted of “physical 
torture,” then five jumps in four days, including one night jump.76 The training was indeed 
demanding compared to the sedentary work of a weatherman, and the pace was quick.77 The 
commitment of the new recruits, however, was unwavering. This became evident in an episode 
recounted by Conaty. While waiting for their first jump, his group observed one of the men from 
the class before them suffer a chute malfunction and plummet to the ground. Despite this 
                                                 
73. This was mentioned by the majority of sources, along with personal interviews from some of the 
weathermen, however, I am unable to find the memo or date of this document. 
74. This number varies depending on source. Fuller’s book, Thor’s Legions, places the numbers at eleven 
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76. William M. Leary, “Weatherman with Tito: The Adventures of Joseph Conaty,” Behind the Lines: The 
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potentially discouraging experience, Conaty and his class completed all their jumps. Following 
graduation, the weathermen were sent back to Cairo for several other physical exams and were 
subsequently transported to Bari.78 
Mission to Yugoslavia 
 Operation BUNGHOLE (sometimes referred to as the California MET in some OSS 
reports) was the planned insertion of seven OSS trained weather teams behind enemy lines in 
Yugoslavia.79 Although it appears from that only four teams actually made it into Yugoslavia, 
the other teams remained on standby. BUNGHOLE, along with the British Operation ORATION 
and Soviet Operation MANHOLE, was part of the joint special operations contingent, Advanced 
Force 133,  which fell under the command of British SOE officer Brigadier Fitzroy MacLean.8081 
Its goal was to aid and support Marshal Tito and his Partisans against the Nazi occupation of 
Yugoslavia as well as conduct espionage and sabotage missions throughout the Balkans.82 The 
main base of operations was located at Tito’s headquarters in Drvar, with the garrison based out 
of Bari. Operations in Yugoslavia were supported by U.S. Lieutenant General Ira C. Eacker, 
Allied commander of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Under his command was the 
12th and 15th Army Air Forces and the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Desert and Balkan Force, 
stationed out of Brindsi, Italy, about 60 miles south of Bari. 
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The first group of OSS weathermen arrived in Bari at the beginning of February 1944. Its 
weather data was to be used to for the following purposes: 1) to support Marshal Tito’s Partisans 
with supplies to fight against the Nazis, as outlined during the Tehran Conference, 2) to supply 
accurate weather for air supplies, nickeling sorties (the dropping of propaganda leaflets) and 
bombing raids and 3) to allow for the rescue and evacuation of downed Allied pilots and injured 
Partisans.83 
The initial plan was to have two teams, each consisting of one weather forecaster, an 
observer and a radio operator, insert by parachute near Drvar on February 19. Due to poor 
weather conditions, the flight was postponed until February 27. Two C-47s, accompanied by 
nine Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.82 bombers and twenty-four P-47 Thunderbolts, flew into 
Yugoslavia.84 Due to a severe snowstorm, only one C-47 was able to identify the agreed upon 
ground signal. The letter “V” which confirmed the drop zone (DZ) was clear of any dangers, 
enabling the first team of weathermen to jump through “Joe-Holes.”85 This was followed by an 
air drop containing the mandated weather equipment.86 The first operational OSS weathermen on 
the ground were forecaster Captain Cecil E. Drew and weather observer Conaty.87 Their weather 
equipment consisted of a handheld anemometer, a mercurial and aneroid barometer, a sling 
psychrometer, a rain gauge, a thermometer, reduction to sea level tables, a plotting board, a 
theodolite, balloons and a portable hydrogen apparatus used to launch the balloons for upper air 
                                                 
83. Besides the weather objective, the other objectives were not fully disclosed until after the SOE/OSS 
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analysis.88 The gear allowed the weather team to conduct accurate observations and collect upper 
air data which were then given to the forecaster to conduct a single-station analysis. This was a 
technique used to forecast weather patterns from numerous meteorological observations taken at 
a single geographic location. Once the observations and forecasts were made, they were given to 
the radioman to send back to Bari using a double-cypher system. From there, the Officer-in-
Charge of the OSS weather mission furnished the reports to the OSS and the 12th WS for 
mission planning purposes.89 
Having parachuted in near Drvar, Drew’s team (being the ranking American 
weathermen) met up with the local Partisans who brought them to a cabin where they lived for 
eight days. They eventually reached Tito’s headquarters, located in a cave halfway up a 
mountainside above a waterfall. They were promptly given quarters and were introduced to the 
British team that debriefed them on the current situation. Then, British Sergeant Major Charlie 
Brown introduced them to Raki, a favorite local beverage derived from distilled plum juice. They 
began their weather duties the following day. Taking observations four times a day (at 0600, 
1200, 1800 and 2400) and developing forecasts, they radioed the information back to Bari. 
Although most days were relatively uneventful, they grew accustomed to the morning wake-up 
calls 3-4 times a week by P-38s and P-40s, which escorted the B-17 and B-24 bombers flying 
overhead. Conaty was told that these aircraft were dropping supplies on various locations in 
Yugoslavia to resupply the Partisans and conduct bombing raids on German aircraft factories in 
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Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Each time a mission was a success, the P-38 or P-40 would do a 
belly-roll to indicate that to the Allies below.90  
Despite the success of these missions, the German Luftwaffe consistently flew its Junkers 
Ju 87 Stukas overhead as a display of force. As Conaty recounts, “if you’ve never been exposed 
to Stuka dive bombing, you have not lived, particularly in a military sense.”91 On March 24, 
Conaty noticed a German bi-plane flying overhead in a pattern consistent with reconnaissance 
and aerial photography. This information was passed to Tito through the British. The following 
day the Germans launched Operation Rösselsprung (Knight’s Move), a full-scale attack to 
capture Tito and eliminate his “pesky-partisans.”92 The attack was headed by Marshal von 
Weichs and included elements of the 1. Gebirgs Division (1st Mountain Division), 
Panzerabteilung 202 (202nd Tank Battalion), 92nd Panzergrenadier Division (Motorized 
Infantry Regiment) and the SS-Fallschirmjägerbataillon 500 (500th SS Parachute Battalion).93 
Tito, his Partisans and SOE/OSS members knew it was time to leave. Following a sixteen-day 
escape and evasion plan over the Dinaric Alps, Drew’s team was finally rescued and evacuated 
back to Bari, three days after the evacuation of Tito. They were then transported back to Cairo to 
return to their normal weather duties at the 19th WS.  
The second weather team parachuted into Yugoslavia on the night of March 13, 1944. 
S/Sgt Joseph W. Newmyer, S/Sgt Ralph C. Baker and their radioman dropped through the Joe-
Hole in a C-47 and landed in Slovenia, located in the mountainous northwest region of 
Yugoslavia. The drop was disastrous compared to Drew’s team. The pilot misjudged the winds, 
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which caused the dispersion of cargo and troops across the mountains. It took Baker the better 
part of an hour to link up with the Partisans and after four days of collecting their gear – most of 
which was destroyed either from parachutes not deploying or the crates being smashed from 
rolling down the mountainside – the group loaded what was left on an oxen-drawn cart and 
headed to the local Partisan headquarters.94 On March 24, after having traveled to Semic and 
Draga to avoid enemy patrols, they were able to transmit their first encoded weather observation; 
however, it wasn’t until April 24 that they obtained confirmation from Bari that their 
transmissions were received. 1st Lt. Robert J. Schraeder, the team’s forecaster, parachuted in via 
a British Halifax on May 14. Originally scheduled to jump with his team, he was delayed due to 
an ear infection but managed to link up with the others on May 18 after a brief layover at the 
local Partisan headquarters.95  
Under constant attack from the Slovenian anti-communist White Guard, the Serbian’s 
secret military group Black Hand, or the Germans, Schraeder’s team was never in one place for 
more than ten days. Despite broken equipment and endless attacks, the team was still able to 
send back weather information for OSS and AAF consumption. The weather team also served 
three additional purposes while in the country. The first was to train local Partisans in basic 
weather observation techniques to utilize once the weathermen were gone. The second was to 
provide weather information to the Balkan Air Terminal Service (BATS), which maintained 
concealed airstrips used to evacuate downed pilots and injured Partisans. The third, and arguably 
most compelling, was to set up their weather station close to the German stations and send out 
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observations and forecasts during the same time in order to break the German weather code for 
Allied use.96 After six months of weather support, Schraeder and his team finally departed on 
September 3 and headed back to Bari where they were debriefed and returned to Cairo to rejoin 
the 19th WS.97 
Two other weather teams landed in Yugoslavia during this period. One was led by 
forecaster Warrant Officer (JG) Harold F. Guth and included observers S/Sgt Gordon B. Bremer 
and S/Sgt John C. Gaffney. The three arrived on the island of Vis off Yugoslavia’s Dalmatian 
coast by PT boat sometime in March, where they began to transmit weather information back to 
Bari. The other known team was headed by forecaster Capt. James H. Armstrong with observer 
S/Sgt James W. Anderson. On May 9, they parachuted into Montenegro along the southern 
portion of the Dinaric Alps. Armstrong recounted his mission in the official publication of the 
19th Weather Squadron, WW 19, released in late 1944. Having gone through the Base Censor 
shop prior to being sent stateside, all sensitive information was scrubbed from his account. What 
was left, though, were the harrowing details of the team constantly being on the move from a 
barrage of Stuka bombers and a hint to their location being somewhere on the air route to the 
Ploesti Oil Fields.98  
          We do not know the precise location of Armstrong’s team, but it can be noted (see Figure 
2) that the four weather teams were strategically placed along the western edge of the Dinaric  
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Alps, as well as off the coast of Yugoslavia.99 As evidenced in the field reports, each team was 
located on the windward side of the Dinaric Alps, indicating that they were there to report the 
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weather on the local orographic effects. The strategic placement of these combat weathermen 
was therefore integral to maintaining effective military action in the Balkan region.  
Impact of OSS Weathermen in Yugoslavia 
Given the complexity of a world war, it is sometimes difficult to quantify success. In the 
case of the OSS weathermen in Yugoslavia, their accomplishments can be measured statistically, 
through the increase of sorties and airdrops during that timeframe, through the OSS impact on 
Partisan military success in WWII and through the continued use of special operations weather in 
military missions. 
The 62nd Troop Carrier Group, commanded by the 12th Army Air Force, flew 82 sorties 
and dropped 187.7 tons of supplies to the Balkans in February and March 1944.100 In late March, 
the 60th Troop Carrier Group took over, and with the help of OSS weather reports, a marked 
increase occurred in both sorties flown and supplies dropped over the Balkans. In April, 445 
sorties were flown and 380.8 tons of supplies were dropped, reaching a peak in June with 943 
sorties and 1,227.8 tons of supplies. While OSS weathermen were in theater the AAF flew 3,829 
sorties and dropped 4,349.8 tons of supplies to the Partisans and evacuated an estimated 19,000 
personnel.101 Although operations did not cease when the OSS weathermen left the area, the 
number of sorties and supplies dwindled to an amount equivalent to when they first took over 
operations in April. 190 sorties were carried out in October with 99.2 tons of supplies being 
dropped. The 15th Army Air Force also launched a major operation against the Ploesti Oil 
Fields, flying continuously over Yugoslavia into Romania from April through August. This 
effort included a total of 22 missions, which resulted in the reduction of oil output by 60%, 
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equaling 15% of Germany’s gasoline supply.102 It is therefore clear that the presence of OSS 
weathermen in the Balkan region led to a major increase in supply-drop missions.  
Measuring success in terms of Partisan activity is relatively simple. Tito’s Partisans, with 
the help of SOE/OSS agents and resupply missions from the Allies, maintained a consistent 
threat to German forces. Tito was able to escape and continue his quest of liberating Yugoslavia 
from Nazi control. On September 6, 1944, the Soviets entered the country and, through a joint 
offensive, the remaining Germans were forced out of Yugoslavia.103 From May 1941 to 
December 1943, Tito made little headway against the Axis, however in less than year with 
SOE/OSS support, Tito was able to help liberate his country from the puppet regime forced on 
them when the existing Yugoslav government fled to London in 1941. Tito’s successful use of 
SOE/OSS and Allied support did not go unnoticed by Hitler; in July 1944, Himmler quoted 
Hitler saying, 
To call a man like Tito a Marshal is absolutely correct. A man who has practically 
no materiel at his disposal, who keeps a full enemy force constantly on the alert, 
and who always recuperates from our blows deserves this title much more so than 
some of our own Colonels, Generals and Field Marshals who could not operate 
skillfully with the finest machine the world has ever known.104 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 The dawn of SOWT was indeed the result of fortuitous circumstances. The advancement 
of meteorological knowledge, techniques and equipment prior to the outbreak of WWII was 
nothing short of good timing, planning and resources. The capitulation of the Yugoslav 
government, which resulted in the rise of the Chetnicks and Partisans resistance groups provided 
a good opportunity for the newly formed OSS to showcase its intelligence-gathering abilities. 
For this, the OSS and Allied forces needed more accurate weather observations and forecasts to 
support the Partisans and attack enemy targets across the region. Cross-channel flights from Italy 
to the Balkans was no easy feat. Despite the advancements made to aircraft, weather forecasts 
became more crucial to accomplish the mission. As such, OSS weathermen from the 19th WS 
were trained in parachuting techniques by the British and dropped behind enemy lines to fulfil 
these requirements. 
 The fact that operations in the Balkans, specifically those of the OSS weathermen, have 
been overlooked by historians and scholars alike, is somewhat perplexing. Especially since the 
U.S. Army published an in-depth study on the impacts of weather and how it affected missions 
following the end of WWII.105 In almost all books concerning aerial combat, weather is 
mentioned as a key element in the ability to successfully complete the operations. Most of the 
references though are negative, blaming the weather for poor performance, yet, at the same time, 
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boast of success rates when it comes to supplying the Partisans with supplies and the ability to 
rescue downed pilots in hostile territory.106 
 Those few which do mention the OSS Weathermen as a crucial piece of the overall 
mission, do so in such a fashion that it is just a mere reference with inaccurate information. 
According to OSS reports during the time, weather was singled out as an important aspect of 
success. One report stated “procuring reliable weather data from key locations in enemy and 
enemy-occupied countries is vitally important to effective aerial operations.”107 In fact, it was 
reported that: 
 (1) It is desirable to establish here local weather stations wherever possible. The proposed 
station in Serbia would be strategically well located as it lies in a direct line to important 
targets in southern Rumania and northern Bulgaria. Among those are such places as 
Bucharest, Ploesti, Constanta, the Danube river, Rumanian communications, etc. (2) Further 
use of this station and its personnel could be made in the recently implemented plan to 
evacuate airman from Yugoslavia …108 
 
The evacuation mentioned was called Operation HAYLARD, the beginning of daytime 
operations to land in Yugoslavia and recue the downed pilots who were stranded in country. The 
newly formed Air Crew Rescue Unit (ACRU) was responsible the safe return of 372 downed 
Allied airmen between August 8 and September 1, 1944.109  
Success in Yugoslavia, and to a greater extent, the war in the Balkans, was due in large part 
to the OSS weathermen who infiltrated the region and supplied weather data to the Allied Air 
Forces. This effort was crucial to being able to supply the Partisans with equipment, supplies and 
en-route data for successful strategic and tactical attacks on targets inside Yugoslavia and 
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throughout the Balkans. This included one of Germany’s main supplies of fuel, the Ploiesti oil 
fields in Romania. OSS weathermen also helped in the establishment of BATS, which enabled 
supplies which could not be air-dropped to be delivered to the Partisans. BATS was multi-
functional as it also served in the evacuation of injured Partisans, which were treated and 
returned to the frontlines to continue the fight. ACRU, as previously mentioned, was a success in 
part to the weather units on the ground. They were also instrumental in cracking the German 
Weather Code by establishing OSS-run weather stations close to German airfields, which 
allowed the Allies to send out their weather data at nearly the same time as the Germans did to 
compare and contrast the information. Lastly, this group provided a benchmark for future 
operations utilizing weathermen in OSS-led and other clandestine missions, including 
OVERLORD and MARKET GARDEN, as well as future OSS operations in the European and 
Pacific Theaters, which have not yet been explored in great detail.110 
The effective and continued use of weathermen behind enemy lines is without a doubt a 
force multiplier on the battlefield. Equipped only with their meteorological knowledge and basic 
airborne training, the OSS’ first weather operators volunteered to operate in dangerous and 
austere environments without any knowledge of what to expect. In doing this, they paved the 
way for an entirely new, now indispensable, specialty in the U.S. Air Force, which has since 
been involved in every overt and covert U.S. military operation. This thesis has demonstrated 
that the missions undertaken by the SOE/OSS in the Balkans, specifically in Yugoslavia, were 
instrumental in solidifying the Nazi defeat on the Eastern Front as the rise of Tito allowed the 
                                                 
110. Weathermen jumped in with the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions on D-Day, along with flying 
gliders in during the initial assault and performing amphibious landings on Utah Beach. Al Moyers, “AAF 
Weathermen Participated in D-Day Invasion,” Air Force Weather Historian 2, no. 2 (2004): 1, 4. Submarine and 
parachute infiltrations were also done in the Pacific Theaters with the OSS DET 404, most notably that of Sgt. 
Cornelius L. Gray who worked with the Karens and Burmese soldiers to locate POW camps, send weather 
intelligence and supply target identification. Memo, Operation Report, PILOT I, Sept. 15, 1945, Records of the 
Office of Strategic Services, Record Group 226, Entry 154, Box 154, Folder 2613. 
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Red Army to continue their advance to Berlin in 1945. The OSS weathermen embodied the 
current special operations weather motto Coela Bellatores (Weather Warriors) by overcoming 
every obstacle they encountered and setting the example for future SOWT generations. 
  
65 
 
Bibliography 
Unpublished Primary Sources 
Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 
 
IRISNUM 00065224: Squadron/0015/Combat Mapping. 
IRISNUM 00077903: Group/0014/Fighter. 
IRISNUM 00108992: Wing/0304/Bombardment (Heavy). 
IRISNUM 00214907: Strategic Air Forces in Europe. 
IRISNUM 00242656: Balkan Air Force. 
IRISNUM 00242675: Allied Force Headquarters. 
IRISNUM 00243318: Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. 
IRISNUM 00248916: 0015 Air Force. 
IRISNUM 01025179: Cabell, Charles P. 
IRISNUM 02007969: Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Bunghole (Operation). 
Grey Beret Association (GBA) Archives, Huntington, West Virginia. 
Bremmer, Gordon, B. Personal Written Communications. No Date. 
 
Conaty, Joseph J. Jr. Personal Written Communications. Numerous Dates. 
 
Conaty, Joseph J. Jr. Video Interview. 1996. 
 
Guth, Harold F. Personal Pictures, 1944.  
 
The National Archives (TNA), Kew, London. 
 
HS 8/1: OSS (Office of Strategic Services) Directive. 
 
HS 8/2: Operations European Theatre. 
 
HS 8/5: Balkans and Middle East. 
 
HS 8/7: OSS: Middle East. 
 
The University of Texas at Dallas, History of Aviation Collection, Dallas, Texas. 
66 
 
 
William M. Leary Papers. Yugoslav Partisans and Special Operations in World War II. 
 
United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland. 
 
RG 171: Records of the Office of Civilian Defense [OCD]. 
 
RG 226: Records of the Office of Strategic Services [OSS]. 
 
RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. 
 
Published Primary Sources 
Armstrong, James H. “Yugoslavia.” WW 19 2, no.2. (November 1944). 
 
Arnold, Henry H. Global Mission. New York: Harper, 1949. 
 
Graham, T.A. “Partisans were our Friends.” 19th Weather Squadron. December 4, 1944. 
 
Graham, T.A. “Guerilla Observers.” Weather Service Bulletin, no. 6. (January 1945): 16-20. 
 
Hight, Charles, T. “The Yugoslavia Caper.” Air Weather Association Newsletter, Vol. 13 (July 
1999): 10-12. 
 
Historical Section, Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. Air Power in the 
Mediterranean, November 1942-February 1945. Caserta, Italy: Headquarters, 
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, 1945.  
 
Hoptner, Jacob B. Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1962. 
 
Roosevelt, Kermit. War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) Vol 1 and 2. New York: 
Walker, 1976. 
 
Lindsay, Franklin. Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime 
Yugoslavia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. 
 
Maclean, Fitzroy. Eastern Approaches. London: Penguin Books, 1991. 
 
Schraeder, Robert A., “Special Account: Activities Report, Station B, Project A.” History of the 
Nineteenth Weather Squadron Region. (28 September, 1944): 1-11. 
 
United States. A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49. Prepared at 
the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Staff of the Committee 
and the Department of State. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950. 
 
United States. Basic Weather for Pilot Trainees. Washington: War Department, 1942. 
67 
 
 
United States. Elementary Weather for Air Crew Trainees. Washington, DC: War Department, 
1943. 
 
United States, Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The Army Air Forces in World War II: 
Europe: Augment to V-E Day. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. 
 
United States and William Weber. The Weather Bureau Record of War Administration. 
Washington, DC: The Bureau, 1948. 
 
United States. United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations. 
Washington. DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957. 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Air Weather Association. Air Force Weather: Our Heritage 1937-2012. 2nd ed. Compiled by 
George N. Coleman III. AFW 37-12v2. Offutt AFB: Air Weather Service and Air Force 
Weather Agency, 2014. 
 
Anderson, Scott. “‘With friends like these ...’ the OSS and the British in Yugoslavia.” 
Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 2 (1993): 140-171. 
 
Atkinson, Rick. The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944. New York: Henry 
Holt. 2007. 
 
Atkinson, Rick. The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945. New York: 
Henry Holt. 2013. 
 
Banac, Ivo. "Yugoslavia.” The American Historical Review 97, no. 4 (1992): 1080-1104. 
 
Bates, Charles C. and John F. Fuller. America's Weather Warriors: 1814-1985. College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 1986. 
 
Caruana, Anthony F. William J. Donovan: Visionary, Strategic Leader: An Historical 
Perspective. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1991. 
 
Clissold, Stephen. Whirlwind; An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power. New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1949. 
 
Cox, John D. Storm Watchers: The Turbulent History of Weather Prediction from Franklin’s 
Kite to El Niño. New York: John Wiley, 2002. 
 
Craven, Wesley F. and James L.Cate. The Army Air Forces in World War II Vol. III: Europe: 
Augment to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945. Office of Air Force History, USAF. 
Washington, DC: University of Chicago Press, 1983. 
 
68 
 
Deroc, Milan. British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil, 1941-1943, and the 
British Response. Irvington, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988. 
 
Dunlop, Richard. Donovan: America’s Master Spy. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982. 
 
Freeman, Gregory A. The Forgotten 500: The Untold Story of the Men Who Risked all For the 
Greatest Rescue Mission of World War II. New York, NY: Penguin, 2007. 
 
Ford, Kirk, Jr. OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1943-1945. College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1992. 
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Roberts, Walter R. Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1973. 
 
Smith, Bradley F. The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA. New York: Basic 
Books, 1983. 
 
Smith, Richard. H. OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. 
 
Troy, Thomas F. Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Frederick, MD: Univ. Publications of America, 1984. 
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APPENDIX A 
PHOTOGRAPHS FROM OPERATION BUNGHOLE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Figure 1. Capt. Charles T. Hight. Commander of the OSS weather teams 
          in Yugoslavia. British parachute training in Ramit-David, Palestine. 
         February 1944. 
         Source: Courtesy, Grey Beret Association. 
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Figure 2. S/Sgt Joseph J. Conaty Jr. Spring 1944 at Drvar, 
Yugoslavia, while deployed to Tito’s headquarters performing weather 
duties. Taken in Spring 1944 at Drvar, 
         Source: Courtesy, Grey Beret Association. 
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   Figure 3. The home of Capt. Drew and his team at Dravr, Yugoslavia. Spring 
   1944. 
   Source: Courtesy, Grey Beret Association. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   Figure 4. Looking at Tito’s headquarters on the mountainside from the OSS  
   weather station at Dravr, Yugoslavia. Spring 1944. 
   Source: Courtesy, Grey Beret Association. 
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Figure 5. Warrant Officer (JG) Harold F. Guth. Guth, who led an OSS weather 
Team to the island of Vis, uses a tripod-mounted theodolite to track and record 
weather balloons. Cairo, Egypt, Summer 1943. 
   Source: Courtesy, Grey Beret Association. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 6. A member of WO Guth’s three-man weather team on the island of Vis. 
   Note the barograph in the background, which records pressure readings from an 
   aneroid barometer. Summer 1944. 
   Source: Courtesy, Grey Beret Association. 
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   Figure 7. WO Guth’s three-man weather team on the island of Vis outside the 
   make-shift weather station. The view overlooks the airfield and harbor.  
   Summer 1944. 
   Source: Courtesy, Grey Beret Association. 
 
 
Figure 8. Vis. “American-built airstrip – 4500 ft. Taxi-ways and dispersal areas along hillside. 
British airstrip enlarged for parking area. Five P-38s in foreground. Three ‘Libs’ in corner. Tail-
less ‘Lib’ at one edge of main runway. Airport started April 23 [1944], first plane landed April 
30 [1944].” Summer 1944. 
Source: Courtesy, Grey Beret Association. 
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 Figure 9. (L) “Young Partisan soldier,” Vis. 
 Note the red star emblem on the hat, identifying 
 himself as a Partisan. Summer 1944. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10. (Bottom) “Starting out on a raiding    
 party,” Vis. Men, women and children all fought 
 as part of Tito’s Partisans. Summer 1944. 
 Source: Courtesy, Grey Beret Association. 
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